Provider involvement in business service definition: A typology

This paper proposes a typology for provider roles in defining business services. The starting point of the study is the underlying rationale of much of the service purchasing literature that buyers have or can easily access the necessary know-how to procure business services. If this does not hold, the implication is that buying firms would shy away from buying complex services. An alternative perspective recognizes that purchasing business services requires its own set of sourcing capabilities, which may be lacking. Buying firms may have limited know-how in terms of defining and articulating their requirements or not be fully aware of them in the first place. However, the buyer's lack of sourcing capabilities need not be an injunction to internalize the service. In these circumstances, service providers step in, help buying firms specify their requirements and play a key role in defining what is procured and how. We build on this interactive view of service definition to undertake a comparative case analysis of four business service contracting situations arrayed along two dimensions — buyer perceived uncertainty and provider's buyer-specific experience. We conclude that service providers play different roles in each case. These are classified as translating, re-engineering, developing, and fine-tuning roles.     

Bancruptcy in a model of unsecured claims

Summary. We study a two periods model of incomplete markets with nominal assets unsecured by collateral, where agents can go bankrupt but there are no bankruptcy penalties entering directly in the utility function. We address two cases: first, a proportional reimbursement rule under bounded short sales and limited liability and, secondly, a nonproportional reimbursement rule, favoring smaller claims, without bounds on short-sales, but assuming that liability approaches total garnishment as debt goes to infinity. Received: September 10, 1998; revised version: August 6, 2001     

Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador

This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province-level electoral results, we test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measures of inequality and elite power used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution.     

Structural economic dynamics: an alternative approach to North-South models

This paper isolates the mechanisms responsible for the difficultiesfacing poor regions in growing faster than rich ones. The analysisof uneven development is carried out in a framework where changesin demand composition are consistent with Engel's Law. The standpointof the analysis is the interaction between technical progress—whichproduces responses in per capita income—and changes ofper capita consumption. The paper focuses on one case in whichpreferences are homothetic and there is capital dependence,showing that the latter assumption is sufficient to explainthe inequalities between poor and rich regions. When dealingwith the case of non-homothetic tastes, adverse movements inthe terms of trade and the international demonstration effect,which are both due to the inelastic demand for goods producedby poor regions, are the mechanisms responsible for uneven development.     

Ergodic chaos, learning and sunspot equilibrium

Summary. In this paper we construct sunspot equilibria that arise from chaotic deterministic dynamics. These equilibria are stationary and have absolutely continuous stationary measures. We prove that they can be learned by a simple rule based on the histograms of past state variables. This work gives a theoretical justification for complex deterministic models that might compete with stochastic models to explain real data. Also we prove the stochastic stability of the indeterminate equilibrium.